The 14 intelligence points of error identified by congressional investigators that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to travel on Christmas Day when authorities said he attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner:


1. The State Department didn't revoke Abdulmutallab's American visa.

2. He wasn't placed on the "Terrorist Screening Database," the Selectee List, nor the No Fly List.

3. Relevant intelligence was not reported to all appropriate CIA individuals and offices.

4. A CIA regional division at CIA headquarters didn't search databases that contained reports related to Abdulmutallab.

5. The CIA didn't disseminate key intelligence reporting until after the attempted attack.

6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center office conducted a limited name search and failed to uncover key reports about Abdulmutallab.

7. CIA Counterterrorism Center analysts failed to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.

8. FBI counterterrorism analysts couldn't access all relevant reports.

9. National Counterterrorism Center's directorate of intelligence failed to connect the reporting on Abdulmutallab.

10. National Counterterrorism Center's Watchlisting Office didn't conduct additional research to find more derogatory information to put Abdulmutallab on a watchlist.

11. The National Security Agency didn't pursue opportunities that could have provided information on Abdulmutallab.

12. Analysts didn't connect key reports partly identifying Abdulmutallab, and they failed to ensure distribution of all relevant reporting.

13. The NSA didn't nominate Abdulmutallab for watchlisting or the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment database based on information partly identifying him.

14. Intelligence analysts were primarily focused on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), rather than threats to the U.S. homeland from the al-Qaida affiliate.


On the Net:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report: http://intelligence.senate.gov/100518/1225report.pdf