AMB. GORDON SONDLAND: The truth about Iran's 'imminent threat' that politicians hate to admit

There is nothing wrong with questioning U.S. policy toward Iran. In fact, it is essential. The press should probe, Congress should challenge, and both parties should debate the wisdom of any potential military action. These are not trivial matters, and the stakes—American lives, regional stability and nuclear proliferation—are too high for anything less than serious scrutiny.

What has become troubling, however, is how unserious the conversation has become around a single phrase: "imminent threat."

Following recent testimony by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, a number of lawmakers—particularly Democrats—expressed disbelief when she stated that whether a threat qualifies as an "imminent threat" is ultimately a determination made by the president. Some Republican voices, eager to distance themselves from the political risks of escalation, have echoed similar skepticism, suggesting that unless there is clear, near-term evidence of an attack, any preemptive posture is unjustified.

Both sides are missing the point.

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The intelligence community’s role is to assess capabilities, estimate timelines and evaluate intent. It provides a range of probabilities and scenarios. It does not—and should not—make the final determination about when a threat becomes an "imminent threat." That responsibility rests with the president, who must integrate intelligence with military readiness, alliance considerations and the broader strategic landscape.

The problem with the current debate is that an "imminent threat" is being treated as if it has a precise, universally accepted definition. It does not.

In a conventional setting, an imminent threat might be easy to identify: troops massing at a border, missiles being fueled, orders being transmitted. But nuclear proliferation does not unfold that way. It is gradual, opaque and often deliberately ambiguous. A regime like Iran’s advances its capabilities in stages—enriching uranium, refining weaponization and expanding delivery systems—without ever presenting a single, definitive moment that clearly signals that the threshold has been crossed.

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If the standard for an imminent threat is that the Ayatollah must be on the verge of pressing a launch button, then the United States has already forfeited its ability to prevent the outcome. At that stage, the options available are severely constrained, and the risks multiply dramatically.

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the regime has consistently and openly defined itself in opposition to the United States and its allies. ‘Death to America’ has not been a slogan used in passing; it has been a defining feature of the regime’s identity. 

A more realistic assessment recognizes that the convergence of capability and intent defines an imminent threat.

And on the question of intent, there should be no confusion.

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the regime has consistently and openly defined itself in opposition to the United States and its allies. "Death to America" has not been a slogan used in passing; it has been a defining feature of the regime’s identity. Iran has funded and armed proxy groups throughout the region, targeted U.S. interests and worked systematically to undermine stability from Lebanon to Yemen.

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This is not a regime whose intentions are unclear or evolving. Its posture has been telegraphed for more than 40 years.

When that long-standing intent is paired with advancing capability, the nature of the threat changes.

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If Iran is within one to two years of developing a deliverable nuclear warhead and is simultaneously expanding its ballistic missile capacity, that timeline cannot be dismissed as distant. In strategic terms, it is compressed. The closer those two tracks come to intersecting, the fewer viable options remain for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.

This is not a theoretical concern. It is a question of whether the United States and its allies retain the ability to influence the outcome at all.

Some Democratic critics argue that without concrete evidence of an impending strike, the threshold for an imminent threat has not been met. Their concern, understandably, is that broadening the definition risks justifying unnecessary conflict. That is a legitimate fear, and it deserves to be part of the discussion.

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At the same time, some Republican skeptics suggest that unless the intelligence community can point to a specific, near-term trigger, restraint should be the default. This position, while framed as prudence, risks ignoring the cumulative nature of the threat. Nuclear capability is not built overnight, and waiting for a final signal often means waiting until it is too late to act effectively.

In both cases, the debate is being framed around a false binary: either the threat is immediate and undeniable, or it is speculative and avoidable. Reality lies somewhere in between.

Presidential decision-making in matters of national security rarely benefits from that kind of clarity. It requires evaluating incomplete information, weighing uncertain outcomes and choosing between imperfect alternatives. Acting too early carries costs. Acting too late carries risks that can be far more severe—and irreversible.

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That is why the concept of an imminent threat cannot be reduced to a soundbite. It is contextual. It depends on trajectory—whether the threat is accelerating or contained. It depends on capability—how close an adversary is to achieving its objective. And it depends on intent—what that adversary has demonstrated over time.

In the case of Iran, that trajectory has been consistent. The regime has steadily advanced its nuclear and missile programs while maintaining enough ambiguity to avoid triggering decisive action. It has also demonstrated patience, exploiting divisions among its adversaries and using time as a strategic asset.

Under those conditions, a one- or two-year window is not a margin of comfort. It is a narrowing corridor.

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The media’s fixation on whether a threat meets a narrow definition of "imminent" risks obscuring this broader reality. By focusing on the absence of a singular, immediate trigger, it creates the impression that the situation is less urgent than it is.

This does not mean that any particular course of action is correct or inevitable. There are valid arguments for diplomacy, for containment and for pressure short of military engagement. Those options should be debated thoroughly.

But that debate should be grounded in an accurate understanding of the threat, not an artificially constrained definition of when it becomes real.

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The president’s responsibility is not to wait for perfect certainty. It is to determine when the risk of inaction outweighs the risk of action. That determination is informed by intelligence, shaped by history and tested against consequences that no model can fully predict.

After all the intelligence has been gathered, briefed, challenged and debated—after the charts are reviewed and the timelines are modeled—the final decision does not come from a spreadsheet.

It comes down to judgment.

It comes down to real-world experience, to pattern recognition and to understanding how adversaries actually behave. And yes, it comes down to something less tangible but no less real: instinct.

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At the end of the day, the commander in chief is not deciding whether a definition has been met. The president is deciding whether the American people are at risk—and whether waiting makes that risk worse.

And in those moments, the decision ultimately rests on judgment—and on the instincts of the president, including those times when the hairs on the back of his neck tell him what the data alone cannot.

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