10 key findings from the Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA harsh interrogations

Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, left, and Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., center, take an elevator to the Senate on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Dec. 9, 2014, as Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., was scheduled to release a report on the CIA's harsh interrogation techniques at secret overseas facilities after the 9/11 terror attacks. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite) (The Associated Press)

Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., speaks on his phone on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Dec. 9, 2014, just before Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif. released a report on the CIA's harsh interrogation techniques at secret overseas facilities after the 9/11 terror attacks. American embassies, military units and other U.S. interests are preparing for possible security threats related to the release of a report on the CIA's harsh interrogation techniques at secret overseas facilities. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite) (The Associated Press)

FILE - In this Jan. 5, 2006 file photo, Jose Padilla, center, is escorted to a waiting police vehicle by federal marshals near downtown Miami. The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the CIA program that included torturing al-Qaida detainees provides eight “primary” examples in which the CIA said it obtained good intelligence as a result of what it called “enhanced interrogation techniques” and the Senate panel’s conclusions that the information was available elsewhere and without resorting to brutal interrogations. Padilla was implicated in the so-called Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings plotting. (AP Photo/J. Pat Carter, File) (The Associated Press)

Ten major findings from the newly released summary of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the CIA's detention and interrogation program:

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— Enhanced interrogation techniques used on terror detainees, including simulated drowning and sleep deprivation, were ineffective in gaining intelligence leads that led to important operations against terrorist groups or prevented attacks on the U.S.

— The prison conditions and harsh interrogations of detainees were more brutal than the CIA officials acknowledged to the American public and in contacts with Congress and the White House. The simulated drowning technique of waterboarding was "physically harmful," with effects that included vomiting and convulsions. At least one terror detainee died of exposure in an overseas prison.

— The CIA's management of coercive interrogations and its system of "black site" prisons was "deeply flawed." Personnel were sometimes poorly trained, medical personnel assisted in harsh treatment and record-keeping was mismanaged.

— The agency's use of coercive interrogations was based on a program developed by two psychologists who had no experience in interrogations or counterterrorism. The CIA never conducted a comprehensive analysis of the program's effectiveness.

— The CIA actively impeded or avoided congressional oversight. CIA senior officials repeatedly gave inaccurate information to congressional leaders and at one point under-counted the number of terror detainees who were subjected to harsh treatment under questioning.

— CIA officials often gave inaccurate information about its interrogation program to Bush administration White House and legal officials, preventing a proper legal analysis of the prison operations. Bush legal officials relied on erroneous CIA data to codify the use of waterboarding and nine other enhanced interrogation techniques.

— Interrogators sometimes used harsh tactics not condoned by CIA superiors or White House legal officials. But interrogators and prison officials who violated CIA policies were rarely disciplined or reprimanded.

— Much of the information that the CIA provided to the media about its interrogation and detentions program was inaccurate, preventing clear scrutiny of detainees' treatment.

— The CIA's reliance on harsh interrogations complicated the national security missions of other federal agencies. The FBI abandoned its traditional role in interrogations as the CIA began to rely on harsh methods. And the CIA often resisted efforts by the agency's inspector general to investigate the use of harsh interrogations and conditions in black sites.

— The CIA's harsh interrogations and secret detentions in overseas prisons damaged the reputation of the U.S. around the world.