Published March 22, 2006
ALEXANDRIA, Va. – A manager at an Arizona flight school that trained one of the Sept. 11 pilot-hijackers testified at the Zacarias Moussaoui trial Wednesday that she called the Federal Aviation Administration with concerns over his qualifications for a pilot license, but her concerns were dismissed by an FAA official.
Margaret Chevrette, manager at the flight school, was testifying in the death-penalty trial of Moussaoui, who has confessed to being an Al Qaeda terrorist.
It was the second time this week jurors heard witnesses testify that people in positions of authority in the federal government responded either slowly, negatively — or not at all — to warnings about a possible terrorist attack.
Chevrette said that the school's student, Hani Hanjour, lacked adequate English skills to gain his pilot's license. An FAA official responded to her concerns by suggesting that Hanjour could use an interpreter even though mastery of English is a requirement for a pilot.
Chevrette said that when the Sept. 11 attacks occurred, she knew Hanjour must have been involved.
"I remember crying all the way to work knowing our company helped to do this," she said.
Chevrette said that Hanjour's English was so bad that it took him eight hours to complete an oral exam that should've taken two hours.
Prosecutors in Moussaoui's trial were presenting testimony about the Sept. 11, 2001 pilot-hijackers' training in an apparent effort to show parallels between Moussaoui's flight training and that of other hijackers.
Two other pilot-hijackers from the Sept. 11 attacks abandoned a small airplane on a taxiway of Miami International Airport during their flight training, but their actions didn't attract serious scrutiny from federal officials, another witness said.
Daniel Pursell, a flight instructor at the school where hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi received commercial pilot training testified that instructors at the school breathed "a collective sigh of relief" when Atta and al-Shehhi completed their training and left the school.
Pursell said that the Dec. 26, 2000, incident at the Miami airport was one of several problems the school had with the pair.
Pursell said the tower chief at the airport called the Florida school to berate school officials after the plane was left on the runway. The FAA never questioned Atta and al-Shehhi, Pursell said.
During testimony Tuesday, a terrorism supervisor in FBI headquarters dismissed as "hunches and suppositions" a field agent's concerns about Moussaoui in the weeks before Sept. 11.
The supervisor, Michael Rolince, testified that he had not even read an Aug. 18, 2001, memo written by Minneapolis agent Harry Samit, who arrested Moussaoui and was convinced from the outset that Moussaoui was a terrorist with plans to hijack aircraft.
Rolince, who headed the FBI's International Terrorism Operations section, said he was briefed on Moussaoui only twice by a subordinate in hallway conversations lasting less than a minute.
Rolince concluded that the bureau had a long way to go in building a case against Moussaoui, even though Samit had laid out in a nearly 30-page memo his reasons for believing that the bureau had built a sufficient case to launch an all-out investigation and obtain a search warrant for Moussaoui's possessions.
"What Agent Samit's hunches and suppositions were is one thing," Rolince said. "What we knew was clearly something else."
Samit's memo proved prescient. He correctly predicted two of the six specific charges to which Moussaoui pleaded guilty: plotting international terrorism and air piracy.
Moussaoui is the only person in this country charged in connection with the Sept. 11 attacks. He pleaded guilty to conspiring with Al Qaeda to hijack aircraft and other crimes, but he denies any role in Sept. 11. He says he was preparing for a possible future attack on the White House.
The sentencing trial now under way will determine Moussaoui's punishment: death or life in prison.
The FBI's actions in the time between Moussaoui's Aug. 16, 2001, arrest on immigration violations and Sept. 11, 2001, are key issues at Moussaoui's death-penalty trial. Prosecutors allege that if Moussaoui had revealed his plans for a terrorist attack, the FBI could have thwarted or at least minimized the attacks. To obtain a death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions caused the death of at least one person on Sept. 11.
The defense argues that nothing Moussaoui said after his arrest would have made any difference to the FBI because its bureaucratic intransigence rendered it incapable of reacting swiftly to Moussaoui's arrest under any circumstances.
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema limited the scope of Rolince's testimony after the defense objected that he was trying to describe what the FBI would have done if it had known about Moussaoui's terrorist ties.
The defense argued that speculative testimony based on a hypothetical confession by Moussaoui unfairly implied that Moussaoui had some obligation to confess.
Brinkema allowed some limited hypothetical questioning but advised the jury: "Juries cannot decide cases on speculation. ... Nobody knows what would have happened."