

**Summary of Concerns**  
**Regarding the Nomination of John R. Bolton**  
**To be U.S. Representative to the United Nations**  
**By the Democratic Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee**

**A. Disqualifying Patterns of Conduct**

It is the judgment of the Democratic Staff that four distinct patterns of conduct disqualify John Bolton for the post of U.N. ambassador: (1) Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of intelligence analysts who disagreed with him; (2) in preparing speeches and testimony, Mr. Bolton repeatedly tried to stretch intelligence to fit his views; (3) in his relations with colleagues and subordinates in and out of government, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive behavior and intolerance for different views; and (4) Mr. Bolton repeatedly made misleading, disingenuous or non-responsive statements to the Committee.

**1. *Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of intelligence analysts who disagreed with him.***

- He sought to remove Christian Westermann, a State Department INR analyst who disputed language Bolton tried to use about Cuba's WMD programs (which was Westermann's proper role as INR's representative in the inter-agency clearance process). Mr. Bolton sought his removal three times over a six-month period. Fortunately, all of Westermann's superiors backed him. The Secretary of State even took the extraordinary step of visiting the INR analysts to make clear his support for Mr. Westermann.
- He sought to remove "Mr. Smith", the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, who told this Committee that some of the views Mr. Bolton expressed about Cuba in a speech did not reflect the Intelligence Community assessment. Mr. Bolton and his staff discussed the NIO's removal over several months and Mr. Bolton personally traveled to the CIA to seek his removal, even though he had never met the officer and does not recall ever reading his work. All of the NIO's superiors, including the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, backed him.

**2. *In speeches and testimony, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought to stretch intelligence to fit his views.***

- In the case of Cuba, Mr. Bolton sought repeatedly to exaggerate the Intelligence Community's views about Cuba's WMD programs and support for terrorism. This caused the CIA to take the extraordinary step of republishing the Intelligence Community's standing views on Cuba and BW in the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, a daily publication for the policy community.

- In the case of Syria, in three instances over the course of a year, Mr. Bolton sought to inflate language about Syria's nuclear activities beyond what intelligence analysts regarded as accurate. The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council ordered his staff to resist these efforts. Bolton continued to do this as late as the summer of 2003, when it was becoming clear that intelligence about Iraq's WMD programs had been fundamentally wrong.
- Mr. Bolton's pattern of going beyond his brief on sensitive subjects in speeches that had not been properly cleared caused the Deputy Secretary of State to order Mr. Bolton not to give any testimony or speech that was not personally cleared by the Deputy Secretary or by the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State. No other senior State official was subject to this restriction.

**3. *In his relations with colleagues and subordinates in and out of government, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive behavior and intolerance for different views.***

- In the case of Rexon Ryu, a highly regarded mid-level State Department officer, Mr. Bolton wrongly accused Ryu of withholding a document and, months later, denied him a significant new assignment. Ryu's immediate superior secured him an assignment away from Mr. Bolton's reach, and Ryu ultimately served the Deputy Secretary of State with distinction.
- In the cases of two unnamed State Department officers working in the Non-Proliferation Bureau, Mr. Bolton sought their removal over policy differences. Their immediate superior refused to remove them. More generally, officers in the Non-Proliferation Bureau "felt undue pressure to conform to the views of [Mr. Bolton] versus the views they thought they could support," according to their supervisor.
- In the case of a State Department lawyer, Mr. Bolton wanted him removed from a legal case based on a misunderstanding of a position the lawyer had taken. The State Department Legal Adviser and the Deputy Secretary of State insisted that the lawyer remain on the case, and the Deputy Secretary took the extraordinary step of sending Bolton a memo reminding him that the rules applied to him.
- In the case of Melody Townsel, an AID project director in Kyrgyzstan in 1994 who complained about the performance of a contractor that retained Mr. Bolton as counsel to represent it, Mr. Bolton allegedly chased Townsel through a hotel lobby in Moscow, repeatedly pounded on her door, shouted obscenities at her, and falsely told Townsel's colleagues in Kyrgyzstan that she was under criminal investigation.

#### **4. Mr. Bolton Gave Misleading Testimony to the Committee on Foreign Relations**

In several respects, Mr. Bolton's testimony has been misleading and disingenuous:

- He told the Committee that, after urging Acting Assistant Secretary Tom Fingar to change Christian Westermann's portfolio, "I shrugged my shoulders and moved on." In fact, he tried again a few days later, and again several months later.
- He told the Committee he pursued the removal of the NIO for Latin America only once, stating "I had one part of one conversation with one person one time on Mr. Smith, and that was it, I let it go." In fact, getting rid of the NIO was under review by Mr. Bolton and his staff for several months and *after* Mr. Bolton traveled to the CIA to seek the NIO's removal, Mr. Bolton reportedly told his staff that "he didn't want the matter to slip any further."
- He told the Committee that he did not threaten or try to have anyone punished because of their policy views. In fact, several witnesses said he did just that.
- He told the Committee that U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard approved and supported his July 2003 speech in South Korea. In fact, Ambassador Hubbard himself said that such a statement was misleading and that he had serious concerns about the speech that he conveyed to Bolton at the time.
- He told the Committee that it was his decision to delay testifying on Syria. In fact, Larry Wilkerson (chief of staff to Secretary Powell) told the Committee that the Deputy Secretary of State postponed Mr. Bolton's testimony because it did not reflect Administration policy on a sensitive issue at a sensitive time.

#### **B. The Damage Done – The Damage to Come?**

Mr. Bolton's supporters argue that none of this matters because no officers lost their jobs and because the speeches and testimony that Mr. Bolton actually delivered reflected the views of the Intelligence Community. In fact, at least one highly regarded officer was denied a career-enhancing assignment because of Mr. Bolton, and Mr. Bolton did in fact make public statements on the most sensitive issues that over-stepped Administration policy or were at odds with the views of the Intelligence Community.

But even if no officers had been penalized or unfounded statements made, Mr. Bolton's repeated efforts to remove intelligence analysts and to stretch the intelligence to fit his views had a profoundly negative impact. As Robert Hutchings, the former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, put it: "When policy officials come back day after day with the same complaint and the same instruction to dig deeper for evidence to support their pre-formed conclusions, that is politicization. When those officials seek to remove from office analysts whose views they do not like, that is politicization. The mere effort, even when it is successfully resisted, creates a climate of intimidation and a culture of conformity."

In the wake of our intelligence failures in Iraq – including the misuse of intelligence by policy makers – Mr. Bolton’s behavior should not be rewarded. With the prospect of intelligence challenges to come – including the need to convince other countries of the threat posed by North Korea and Iran – Mr. Bolton’s singular lack of credibility risks becoming a detriment to U.S. interests and security.

Mr. Bolton’s supporters argue that his “blunt style” is what is needed at the United Nations. In fact, Mr. Bolton’s apparent disdain for opposing views, his unwillingness to listen and his inability to persuade make him particularly unsuited for this assignment at this time.

The job of the U.N. ambassador is occasionally to hold high the “United States” nameplate at the Security Council and denounce lies and hypocrisy. But day in and day out, it is “to operate in a low key, quiet, persuasive and consensus building way” to advance U.S. interests, in the words of former U.S. Representative to the U.N. Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Mr. Bolton has proved himself incapable of operating in this manner.

The President of the United States is owed substantial deference in appointments to Executive branch positions. But the advice and consent clause of the Constitution is there for a reason: to serve as a check against unqualified appointees or when appointments would harm the national interest. It is not in the interests of the United States to have Mr. Bolton represent our country at the United Nations. He should be rejected.